Introduction 61
When humans make decisions they are capable of estimating the likelihood that their decision 62 was accurate. This introspective ability falls under a class of cognitive processes known as 63 metacognition because it entails cognizing about the quality of a decision-making process (1) . 64
Intuitively, an individual has high metacognitive accuracy if their estimate of the accuracy of 65 their decision (e.g., as expressed by a confidence rating) corresponds well with the actual 66 accuracy of their decision (2). Because decisions can be made on the basis of information from a 67 plethora of sources-for example, deciding on the basis of current sensory input versus deciding 68 on the basis of information culled from long-term memory-an outstanding question is whether 69 metacognitive processes are domain-general or domain-specific (3). A domain-general 70 metacognitive monitoring process would be expected to evaluate the accuracy of decisions made 71 from both perceptual inputs as well as those based on memory. In contrast, a domain-specific 72 metacognitive system would use independent neural resources or computations to estimate the 73 quality of memory-versus perception-based judgments, for example. 74 75 Recent work on this topic has focused on correlating individual differences in metacognition 76 during perception and long-term memory and has resulted in mixed findings. Several studies 77 have reported non-significant relationships between individual's metacognitive ability in a 78 perceptual task and their metacognitive ability in a long-term memory task (4-6), suggesting 79 domain-specific metacognition. However, another experiment using similar tasks did find a 80 reliable positive correlation between metacognitive abilities in both domains (7) , and other work 81 has shown correlated metacognitive performance across different perceptual tasks (8), suggesting 82 some shared underlying resources. A number of the above-mentioned studies, however, have 83 also reported that structural and function brain imaging data from distinct regions correlated with 84 metacognitive abilities for the distinct tasks, reinforcing domain-specificity at the neural level 85 (4,5,7). Additional evidence for domain-specificity between perception and long-term memory 86 has come from a recent study of patients with lesions to anterior portions of prefrontal cortex. 87
These patients showed a selective deficit it visual perceptual metacognition, but not memory 88 metacognition for a recently studied word list (9). 89 90 A lack of cross-task correlation in metacognition may sometimes be difficult to interpret because 91 this could result from procedural differences between tasks not necessarily related to the 92 cognitive construct under investigation (e.g., the use of different stimuli in the perception versus 93 memory task). Furthermore, perception and long-term memory are themselves quite distinct 94 cognitive functions (although they can certainly interact in some situations, e.g., (10)), and an 95 underexplored question is whether perceptual metacognition relates to metacognition for other 96 cognitive functions more closely related to perception. Across two experiments, we examined 97 whether metacognition in visual perceptual judgments is related to metacognition for visual 98 short-term memory (VSTM) judgments using tasks that differ only in the requirement for 99 memory storage over a short delay. Because visual perception and VSTM has been hypothesized 100 to rely on shared mechanisms and neural representations (11-14), we might anticipate that 101 metacognition in these domains is also based on some shared resource, leading to positively 102 correlated individual differences in metacognition across tasks. (see Figure 1A ). Gratings subtended 2 degrees of visual angle (DVA), had a spatial frequency of 117 1.5 cycles/DVA and a phase of zero. Fixation (a light gray point, 0.08 DVA) was centered on the 118 screen and was dimmed slightly to indicate trial start (see Figure 1A ). Noise consisted of black 119 and white pixels generated randomly on each trial. The contrast of the grating was determined 120 for each subject by an adaptive staircase procedure prior to the main tasks. On a random half of 121 the trials the contrast of both the signal and the noise was halved. This was not expected to 122 impact orientation estimation performance because the signal-to-noise ratio of the stimulus was 123 unchanged (15), but this manipulation was not further explored here. Stimuli were presented on 124 an iMac computer screen (52 cm wide × 32.5 cm tall; 1920 × 1200 resolution; 60 Hz refresh 125 rate). Subjects viewed the screen from a chin rest at a distance of 62 cm. Stimuli were generated 126 and presented using the MGL toolbox (http://gru.stanford.edu) running in MATLAB 2015b 127 (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). 128 129 Staircase procedure. To minimize performance differences across subjects, both experiments 130 began with 100 trials of 1-up, 3-down adaptive staircase procedure controlled by the PEST 131 algorithm (16), which classified responses as correct or incorrect depending on whether they 132 were within 25 degrees of a trial's true orientation. Procedurally, the staircase task was identical 133 to the perceptual task (described below), with the exception of staircasing stimulus contrast. 134 135 Perceptual task. To probe each individual's perceptual metacognitive abilities, we employed an 136 orientation estimation task (17). On each trial, a target grating was presented centrally for 33 ms 137 with a randomly determined orientation between 1-180 o , followed shortly (600 ms) by a highly 138 visible probe grating without noise, whose orientation could be rotated via mouse movement. 139
This short interval between the target and probe was necessary to ensure that the probe had no 140 visual masking effect. Subjects were instructed to match the perceived orientation as closely as 141 possible. Subjects pressed the spacebar to input their orientation response and then used number 142 keys 1-4 to provide a confidence rating. Because performance in this task varies continuously (as 143 opposed to a binary correct/incorrect outcome) we instructed subjects to use the confidence scale 144 to indicate how close they think they came to the true orientation using the scale labels 1 = 145 "complete guess" and 4 = "very close". These perceptual task parameters were the same for both 146 experiments. See Figure 1A for complete trial timings. 147 148 VSTM task. To probe metacognitive abilities for VSTM, we introduced a delay period between 149 the target and the response probe. In Experiment 1, the delay period was fixed at 7 seconds and 150 in Experiment 2 it was randomly sampled from the set: 3.45, 6.30, 9.15, or 12.00 seconds. The 151 stimuli and all other task events were identical to the perceptual task in order to minimize any 152 differences between tasks that are unrelated to the cognitive manipulation of interest 153 154 Procedure. For Experiment 1, perceptual and working memory tasks were performed in separate 155 blocks. Following the staircase, each subject completed one block of 120 trials of the perceptual 156 task, followed by three blocks of 60 trials each of the VSTM task, followed by another block of 157 the perceptual task. This resulted in a total of 240 perceptual trials and 180 VSTM trials per 158 subject, completed in a single 1.5 hour session. Experiment 2 differed in that perceptual and 159 VSTM trials were intermixed within blocks and randomly determined with equal probability to 160 be either a perceptual trial or one of the four delay periods (between 3.45 -12 seconds) of the 161 VSTM task. Intermixing perception and VSTM trials further minimized procedural differences 162 between tasks by eliminating any task-related expecations (since subjects did not know which 163 type of trial would come next) and by removing temporal delays between task performance. 164
Each subject completed 300 trials, seperated into 5 blocks, resulting in an average (± SD) of 55.5 165 (6.4) perceptual trials and 59 (8.0) trials of each delay period of the VSTM task. Total task time 166 was ~1.5 hours. On each trial of the perception and VSTM task, subjects moved a computer mouse to match the 170 perceived or remembered orientation as closely as possible and then provided a confidence 171 rating on a 1-4 scale to indicate how close they thought they came to the true orientation where 172 1 = "complete guess" and 4 = "very close". The tasks differed only by the addition of a 7 173 second delay period for the VSTM task. Quantifying metacognition. Task performance is measured as error (in degrees) between the 181 subject's response and the true orientation on each trial (see Figure 1B ). To relate this 182 continuously varying performance metric to subjective confidence ratings we computed 183 correlations between each trials' absolute error and confidence rating, which indicate how well 184 confidence tracks performance. Error should decrease with increasing confidence so a subject 185 with good metacognition would have a stronger negative correlation between confidence and 186 error than a subject with poor metacognition. Although intuitive, and used elsewhere (18, 19) , 187 this metric is potentially influenced by factors not necessarily related to metacognitive accuracy 188 per se, such as task difficulty and biases in confidence scale use (e.g., under or overconfidence; 189 (20). Although we used a staircase procedure to match difficulty, there was still considerable 190 variability across subjects in median absolute error in both Experiment 1 (range: 8 -16.5 o ) and 191 Experiment 2 (range: 6.9 -23.3 o ). A recently introduced measure called meta-d'/d' can correct 192 for these influences (2), however, meta-d'/d' has been developed only for tasks with discreet 193 outcomes amenable to signal detection theory analysis (e.g., hits, misses) and cannot be applied 194 to the continuous estimations tasks we employed. In order to control for these influences when 195
testing our primary hypothesis about the relationship between perceptual and VSTM 196 metacognition, we ran two additional multiple regression models that included covariates for 197 average and task-specific error and confidence (see Statistics below). In the case of models with 198 multiple predictors, the relationship between perceptual and memory metacognition was for these models was computed as the sum of squares for the perceptual metacognition predictor 203 divided by the total sum of squares for all other predictors and error. 204
205
Additionally, we verified that the results of this analysis were robust to our particular metric of 206 metacognition by repeating all analyses using the non-parametric area under the type 2 receiver 207 operating characteristics curve (A ROC ; (21-23) as our measure of metacognitive accuracy. This 208 measure is obtained by taking the area under the curve formed by plotting the type 2 false alarm 209 rate by the type 2 hit rate at different type 2 criteria. A type 2 false alarm is an incorrect but high 210 confidence trial and type 2 hit is a correct and high confidence trial and the number of 211 confidence criteria is the number of ratings on the scale minus 1. At values of 0.5, this metric 212
indicates that confidence ratings do not discriminate between correct and incorrect trials and 213 values of 1 indicate perfect discriminability. A ROC was computed using the method outlined in 214 (21). Because this metric requires binarizing the data into correct and incorrect responses, we 215 defined thresholds for each subject based on the 75 th percentile of their response error 216 distributions such that a trial with error larger than this threshold was considered incorrect. This 217 analytically set performance at 75% for each subject, equating accuracy for this analysis. Using a 218 common threshold of 25 degrees for each subject did not change the statistical significance of 219 any analyses reported with this metric. Prior to any analysis, trials with response times below 220 200 milliseconds or above the 95 th percentile of the distribution of response times across all 221 subjects were excluded. The same trial exclusion procedure was applied to both experiments. 222 223 Statistics. We used linear regression to predict individual differences in VSTM metacognition 224 from variation in perceptual metacognition scores (Figures 2 and 4) . In a first, "basic model", we 225 considered only these two variables. Then, to control for individual differences in task 226 performance and confidence ratings, we ran two additional regression models. One included each 227 subject's mean error and mean confidence as covariates (3 predictors in total) and the other 228 included task-specific confidence and error as covariates (i.e., mean perceptual error and 229 confidence and mean VSTM error and confidence; 5 predictors in total). These three models 230 were run for each metric of metacognition (r values and A ROC ; see above) and for both 231 experiments. To test for linear effects of confidence on error ( Figures 1C and 3D) we regressed 232 single-trial confidence ratings on absolute error for each subject and task and tested the resulting 233 slopes against zero at the group level using a t-test. To test for performance differences between 234 tasks we compared median absolute error between the perception and VSTM task with a paired 235 t-test. We additionally tested for a linear effect of delay period duration in Experiment 2 ( Figure  236 3B) by fitting slopes to each subject's single-trial absolute error by delay period data and testing 237 these slopes against zero at the group level with a t-test. All tests were two-tailed. 1B. Absolute error significantly decreased with increasing confidence for both the perceptual 242 task (t(19) = -13.48, p < 0.0001) and the VSTM task (t(19) = -14.88, p < 0.0001), indicating that 243 subject's confidence reasonably reflected their task performance at the group level ( Figure 1C) . 244
Error was also significantly greater in the VSTM task as compared to the perceptual task (t(19) = 245 -2.10, p = 0.049), reflecting an expected degradation of orientation information when the task 246 required short-term memory maintenance. 247
248
Central to our hypothesis, we found a robust positive relationship across individuals between 249 perceptual metacognition and VSTM metacognition ( Figure 2) . This relationship was observed 250 when using confidence-error correlations as the measure of metacognition (slope = 0.47, t = 251 2.39, predictor R 2 = 0.24, p = 0.027; Figure 2A ) and, importantly, was still present after 252 controlling for average confidence and error (slope = 0.44, t = 2.24, predictor R 2 = 0.22, p = 253 0.039) and in the model controlling for task-specific confidence and error (slope = 0.52, t = 2.42, 254 predictor R 2 = 0.25, p = 0.029). All covariate predictors in both control models were not 255 statistically significant (ps > 0.27). These results indicate that, although the confidence-error 256 correlation may be influenced by task performance and confidence biases, these factors did not 257 account for the across-subjects correlation between perceptual and VSTM metacognition. 
(A) Cross-task regression using confidence-error correlations as the metric of metacognition. 262
Increasingly complex regression models controlling for task performance and confidence shown 263 from left to right (see Methods The same relationship was observed when using A ROC as the metric of metacognition (Figure  268   2B) . With the basic model, perceptual metacognition significantly predicted VSTM 269 metacognition (slope = 0.77, t = 3.96, predictor R 2 = 0.46, p = 0.0009). This relationship held 270 when controlling for average confidence and error (slope = 0.82, t = 3.78, predictor R 2 = 0.46, p 271 = 0.0016) and when controlling for task-specific confidence and error (slope = 0.88, t = 3.85, 272 predictor R 2 = 0.45, p = 0.0017). As before, all other covariate predictors across both control 273 models were non-significant (ps > 0.26). These results indicate that the relationship observed 274 between perceptual and VSTM metacognition was independent of the particular metric used and 275 was not accounted for by correlated individual differences in task performance or average. 276 277 Experiment 2. This experiment served to replicate the cross-task correlation observed in 278 Experiment 1 while further minimizing procedural differences between tasks by intermixing 279 perceptual and VSTM trials of differing delays ( Figure 3A) . Error increased monotonically with 280 delay duration (t(19) = 2.85, p = 0.010. Figure 3B) , and perception trials had lower error than 281 VSTM trials, collapsing across delays (t(19) = 3.33, p = 0.003), indicating the expected loss of 282 information in VSTM relative to perception. As in Experiment 1, error decreased with increasing 283 confidence during both perception (t(19) = -7.56, p < 0.0001) and VSTM trials (t(19) = -8.99, p 284 < 0.0001), indicating that confidence reliably tracked performance at the group level ( Figure 3C Importantly, we replicated the positive relationship between perceptual and VSTM 296 metacognition with quantitatively better model fits in a new set of subjects. Using confidence-297 error correlations ( Figure 4A ) perceptual metacognition robustly predicted VSTM metacognition 298 in the one-predictor basic model (slope = 0.59, t = 4.64 predictor R 2 = 0.54, p = 0.0002), the 299 three-predictor model controlling for average confidence and error (slope = 0.57, t = 4.27, 300
predictor R 2 = 0.52, p = 0.0005), and in the five-predictor model controlling for task-specific 301 confidence and error (slope = 0.55, t = 3.72, predictor R 2 = 0.49, p = 0.002. All covariate 302 predictors in both control models were non-significant (ps > 0.44). This effect was also observed 303 when using A ROC as the metric of metacognition for the basic model (slope = 0.53, t = 3.88, 304 predictor R 2 = 0.45, p = 0.0011), the three-predictor model (slope = 0.52, t = 3.58, predictor R 2 = 305 0.44, p = 0.002), and the five-predictor model (slope = 0.54, t = 3.43, predictor R 2 = 0.44, p = 306 0.004). All covariates in both control models were non-significant (ps > 0.52). Metacognition is an important aspect of decision-making (24,25), learning (26), development 317
(27), and perhaps certain aspects of conscious experience (28,29), and can be compromised in 318 psychiatric disorders (30). It is currently unclear whether an individual with good metacognitive ability in one domain also has good metacognition in other domains. In Experiment 1, we found 320 that individuals with more accurate metacognition in perceptual judgments also showed more 321 accurate metacognition in a VSTM task requiring stimulus maintenance over a 7 second delay 322 period. This relationship was present when using two different measures of metacognitive 323 performance and regression models controlling for task performance and mean confidence 324 revealed that this effect was not driven by correlated individual differences in task performance 325 or confidence biases. We then replicated these findings in Experiment 2 with a new set of 326 subjects using a task that intermixed perceptual and VSTM trial types within blocks. Intermixing 327 trial types in Experiment 2 more than doubled the proportion of variance in VSTM 328 metacognition explained by perceptual metacognition in the models using error-confidence 329 correlations relative to Experiment 1 when trial types were blocked (mean increase in R 2 = 0.28, 330 a factor of 2.2), highlighting the importance of minimizing procedural differences between tasks. 331 A comparable increase across experiments was not seen, however, when using the AUC metric, 332 which already showed a very large effect size in both experiments and across all models (mean 333 R 2 = 0.45, Cohen's d = 1.81). Taken together, these results provide the first evidence in humans 334 for a medium-to-high positive correlation between an individual's metacognitive abilities in 335 perception and VSTM. 336
337
The present results contrast with recent experiments examining the relationship between 338 metacognition of visual perception and long-term memory, which have typically observed no 339 correlation (4-6; but see 7). We reason that, in contrast to long-term memory, VSTM is thought 340 to rely on the same neural representations that support perception (11-14), and this may underlie 341 the cross-task correlation in metacognitive performance. This explanation follows naturally from 342 "first-order" models of metacognition according to which confidence and task performance are 343 driven by the same internal representation of stimulus evidence (31-34). For example, in signal 344 detection theoretic models, the absolute distance of the decision variable from the decision 345 criterion is a proxy for confidence (35, 36) . Thus, if perception and VSTM were supported by the 346 same internal representation of the stimulus, then the computation of confidence across the two 347 tasks would also be based on the same representations, leading to correlated behavior. "Second- abilities may be high across domains for an individual with superior learning abilities. However, 364 this need not imply that the underlying neural substrate responsible for computing the 365 appropriate levels of confidence is itself domain-general. Similarly, recent work has highlighted 366 specific factors beyond stimulus evidence that modulate confidence, leading to dissociations of 367 confidence and task performance within an individual (15,44,45). For example, spontaneous 368 trial-to-trial fluctuations in oscillatory neural activity in the alpha-band (8-13 Hz), which are 369 thought to reflect visual cortical excitability (46, 47) , have been shown to bias confidence ratings, 370 but not objective performance in a visual discrimination task (40). Perhaps a subject who is less 371 susceptible to such influences from sources not directly related to the difficulty of stimulus 372 discrimination would show better metacognition across different domains. Future work 373 examining neural correlates of metacognitive performance across different domains may 374 contribute in a substantive way to this issue. As an example, McCurdy and colleagues (7) 375 observed a positive correlation between metacognition of perception and recollection memory at 376 the behavioral level, but found distinct (as well as overlapping) neural structures whose gray 377 matter volume related to metacognitive performance in the different tasks. This suggests that 378 only a portion of the processing stages or computations involved in generating confidence need 379 be shared across tasks in order to produce a behavioral correlation. 
